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Abstract
In a meta-analysis published in BMC Medicine, we explored whether evidence-based medicine can actually be sure
that ‘sucrose = sucrose’ in the treatment of depression. This paper, based upon a reductio ad absurdum, addressed
an epistemological question using a ‘scientific’ approach, and could be disconcerting as suggested by Cipriani and
Geddes’ commentary. However, most papers are based upon a mixture of observations and discussions about sense
and meaning. Ultimately, there is nothing more than a story, told with words or numbers. Randomised controlled
trials provide information about average patients that do not exist. These results ignores an entire segment of
therapeutics that plays a crucial role, namely care. This information is usually set out using a ‘grammar’ that is
ambiguous, since statistical tests of hypothesis have raised epistemological questions that are not as yet solved.
Moreover, many of these stories remain untold, and unpublished. For these reasons evidence-based medicine is a
vehicle for many paradoxes and controversies. Reductio ad absurdum can be useful in precisely this case, to
underline how and why the medical literature can sometimes give an impression of absurdity of this sort. Even if
the data analysis in our paper was rather rhetorical, we agree that it should comply with the classic standards of
reporting and we provide the important extra data that Cipriani and Geddes have requested.
Please see related articles: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/11/230 and http://www.biomedcentral.com/
1741-7015/12/105.
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Background
In our recent paper published in BMC Medicine [1], we
explored in a thought-provoking manner whether sci-
ence can actually be sure that ‘sucrose = sucrose’ in the
treatment of major depressive disorder. This paper was
an original piece of research based upon a reductio ad
absurdum, but basically an essay about science and care
with certain epistemological dimensions. We submitted
it to stimulate reflection about the validity of scientific
knowledge in medicine and we are glad that it has
worked, with a very interesting commentary by Cipriani
and Geddes on our published article [2].
Beyond addressing a complex and controversial issue
within the field of antidepressant research, we believed
that the form of this unusual paper raised an important
issue implicitly suggested by Cipriani and Geddes’ com-
ments: does reductio ad absurdum have a place in
evidence-based medicine?
Evidence-based stories
Cipriani and Geddes are right to point out that while our
paper addressed an epistemological question we ap-
proached it ‘scientifically’ by conducting a systematic re-
view and meta-analysis. Indeed, this can be considered as
a challenge to the comfortable dualism at the basis of
modern science: words are seen as being for philosophers
and numbers for ‘hard’ scientists. We clearly militate for
abandoning such a position, which sterilises the debate,
especially in the field of psychiatric research [3]. To sum
up our position on this point, we consider that in most pa-
pers, whether they come from social and human sciences
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or from ‘harder’ sciences, there is a mixture of observation
(the core activity of science, present in the methods and
results section of papers) and discussion about sense and
meaning (more related to philosophy, and in general
present in the discussion section). Ultimately, there is
nothing more than a story, told with words or numbers,
even if it can sometimes be an evidence-based story.
Evidence-based stories concerning an imaginary average
patient
To deal with the question of variability and randomness,
randomised controlled trials (RCT) tell stories about aver-
age patients who, unfortunately or hopefully, do not exist
in practice. Statistical inferences underpinning RCT con-
clusions concern expected values of random variables. In
more human terms, these inferences involve the compari-
son of two or three run-of-the-mill patients (average), with
blurred profiles (standard deviation). The story told by an
RCT focuses on efficacy, sometimes effectiveness, and spe-
cifically on the pre-post difference in a very limited aspect
of the average patient. This story does not tell much about
the individual patient’s story that a clinician is faced with
[4] and ignores an entire segment of therapeutics that
plays a crucial role: care that draws on what we might call
the patient’s ‘irrationality’, which has no place in main-
stream evidence-based stories.
Stories with ambiguous grammar
Natural languages are mainly bottom-up constructions and
this means that stories have more or less the same meaning
for everybody that reads them. This is not true for
evidenced-based stories, which rely on a top-down grammar
that is substantially misunderstood. Indeed, statistical tests
of hypotheses have raised epistemological questions that are
not yet solved [5]. Statistical tests can be used for ‘behav-
ioural inference’ (the perspective proposed by Neyman and
Pearson) or for ‘inductive inference’ (the Fisher perspective).
In the first situation, type-one error is considered, in the sec-
ond, the P-value. Unfortunately, most clinicians and non-
statistician researchers are in the habit of mixing the two ap-
proaches, and this creates fuzziness in most conclusions in
biomedical research in general, and RCTs in particular. The
importance of significance testing in science is surely over-
stated, with a fallacious tendency to deflect attention from
the actual size of an effect [6,7] and dramatic suggestive
power. Translated into clinical practice, statistical signifi-
cance converts into an argument of authority.
Family secrets and storytellers
Most families have secrets, but the kind and importance
vary. When evidence-based stories are told, the story-
tellers at the top of the paper are not always a good indi-
cation of who actually wrote them, since ghost-writing is
endemic [8]. Moreover, many evidence-based stories
remain untold, especially when they do not convey a
positive picture [9]. The highly competitive environment
for researchers’ funding and career promotion, authors’
own ideological conflicts of interest, and the tendency by
editors, reviewers and readers to be ‘scientific novelty-
seekers’, select the newest and most attractive storylines
[10]. The recent contestation of the European Medicine
Agency’s plans for sharing data from clinical trials by Abb-
Vie and InterMune [11] has illustrated how untold stories
can be explicitly considered as trade secrets.
‘Family secrets’ can sometimes cause illnesses and sci-
entific remedies cannot be the cure in the case of Evi-
dence Based Stories. Europe has recently made an
important step forward by voting in favour of a law that
will require all clinical drug trials in Europe to be regis-
tered and their results reported in a public database [12].
Absurd stories and reductio ad absurdum
For these reasons, and despite a grammar based upon
probability, evidence-based medicine boasts more than its
fair share of improbable stories. All the ingredients listed
above are present in antidepressant literature, resulting in
many paradoxes and controversies, based upon different
ways of telling the same stories [13,14]. Reductio ad absur-
dum can be precisely useful in this case, to underline how
and why medical literature can give an impression of ab-
surdity of this sort. In evidence-based medicine, this man-
ner of reasoning is usually confined to Christmas issues in
general journals. This curious ritual probably has an outlet
function, authorising a return of repressed material from
evidence-based medicine in a socially acceptable manner.
Conclusion
We are glad that the BMC Medicine editors and revie-
wers accepted our improbable story in which the data
analysis was in fact rather rhetorical (as indeed are all
evidence-based stories). We agree that it should none-
theless comply with the classic standards of story-telling
[15] and we are pleased to provide the important extra
data that Cipriani and Geddes asked for in two files
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